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COMMENTS
THE SUPREME COURT'S DENIAL OF
CERTIORARI IN DALLAS FIRE
FIGHTERS LEAVES UNSETTLED THE
STANDARD FOR COMPELLING
REMEDIAL INTERESTS
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has been less than clear in its treatment of
affirmative action jurisprudence, leaving lower courts in a quandary
as to how to analyze affirmative action programs challenged by non-
minority plaintiffs. As would be expected, the circuits have settled on
conflicting views as to what sorts of programs, if any, pass constitu-
tional muster. The latest of these cases, Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v.
City of Dallas,' was denied certiorari by the Court on March 29,
1999. Dissenting from that denial, Justice Breyer noted, "[iln light of
the many affirmative action plans in effect in the Nation, the question
presented, concerning the means of proving past discrimination, is an
important one; the lower courts are divided; and the Fifth Circuit's
decision may be questionable in light of our precedents."2
This paper will analyze the important query that Breyer sug-
gested and explore the legal issues that will undoubtedly face future
courts. Although there may be many persuasive reasons for the
Court's refusal to hear the case,3 the standard governing affirmative
' 150 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct 1349 (1999).
2 City of Dallas v. Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 1349, 1349 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Applica-
tion of Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLuM. Huit. RTs. L. REv. 679, 684 (1995) ("The cases which fol-
low [City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)] reflect the confusion on the
part of both the courts and the local and municipal governments as to what amount of statistics,
written testimony, and historical evidence is needed to satisfy the negative standard of
Croson.").
3 One of the most persuasive of these reasons concerns the political controversy sur-
rounding the propriety of affirmative action programs at all. The Court and public are starkly
divided on the subject. Some feel that race, no matter what the purpose, should not be a viable
classification. Others feel that our history of discrimination in this society mandates that indi-
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action in hiring and promotions is confused, and has reached a point
where the Court ought to step in. Circuits have each forged their own
standards for conducting the constitutional inquiry, and not all may be
in line with Supreme Court precedent. The standard of evidence re-
garding remedial purpose in hiring and promotion, as well as the
proper constitutional inquiry, have differed among circuits applying
Supreme Court affirmative action caselaw, and the Fifth Circuit's de-
cision provided an excellent opportunity to resolve the debate. This
Comment will highlight that debate, as it has developed, to give a
sense of the legal environment in which the Dallas decision was
handed down. The primary focus of this limited inquiry will not be to
solve the legal problem, but merely to highlight the major legal and
doctrinal issues present in the Dallas case, as well as the current need
to solve them.
In Part II, I will introduce the Dallas decision, providing a fac-
tual history and description of the legal analysis provided by the Fifth
Circuit. In particular, I will analyze how the court treated the city's
asserted remedial purpose. In Part III, I will briefly describe the Su-
preme Court decisions that govern the inquiry in Dallas, announcing
the existence of the remedy of past discrimination as a compelling
interest, and the evidentiary basis that proponents of affmnative ac-
tion programs must present to show that such a compelling interest
exists. In Part IV, I will analyze the Fifth Circuit's decision in light of
those of the Court, and the legal analysis provided by other circuits
addressing similar problems. I will show that the Fifth Circuit, in
Dallas and prior cases, has chosen to remedy this confusing dilemma
in an interesting, yet problematic, way. The Fifth Circuit requires evi-
dence of past discrimination that goes beyond what the Court has re-
quired, and the standard of evidence it uses is unclear. Moreover, the
overarching constitutional inquiry of the Fifth Circuit is not only out
of line with other circuits, but a misinterpretation of Supreme Court
precedent. Had the Court taken the case, it could have not only solved
the thorny problem of the proper standard of evidence proponents
must meet to demonstrate a remedial purpose, but it also could have
clarified the proper constitutional inquiry for affirmative action pro-
grams in the promotional and hiring context.
viduals attempt to remedy wrongs committed to racial minorities in the past. This controversy is
important to the subject of this paper in that it guides the decisions of individual judges; how-
ever, my purpose is to highlight the legal dilemma that, at times, personifies one's ideological
opinions.
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I. THE CASE: DALLAS FIRE FIGHTERS ASS'N V. CITY OF DALLAS
In 1998, the Fifth Circuit reviewed, for the second time, the af-
firmative action plan of the City of Dallas' fire department in Dallas
Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas.4 Because the city's program
created a racially based classification, the court held that the affirma-
tive action program must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. In applying strict scrutiny 5 to the affirmative
action plan6 of Dallas, the court found the plan failed its four-factor
test for race conscious measures.7 The court did not comment on
whether the City had provided the proper evidentiary basis required to
satisfactorily demonstrate remedial purpose,8 yet it did comment on
the validity of statistical tests demonstrating the past discrimination to
be remedied. The court found that statistical evidence of underrepre-
sentation of racial minorities, in conjunction with a Department of
Justice decree that the department was in violation of Title VII, was
not sufficient to demonstrate "past discrimination." 9 In balancing the
interests involved, the court found such a showing was not enough to
overcome the burden placed on the non-minorities who justifiably
expected promotions but were passed over because of the program.' °
Accordingly, the court disposed of the suit in its entirety by finding
the affirmative action promotions unconstitutional and granting sum-
mary judgment against them."
4 150 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1349 (1999).
- Strict scrutiny is a two prong test. To satisfy the first prong, the court must determine
whether the purpose behind the classificdtion is compelling. The court must be satisfied that the
interest asserted was compelling enough to outweigh the disadvantage to the complaining class,
and also that the asserted interest was the true purpose for which the classification was made. In
second prong analysis, the court must be satisfied that the means chosen to address the compel-
ling interest fit the problem identified. A court determines whether the law or practice is nar-
rowly tailored when considered in light of other possible ways to address the compelling interest
recognized by the court. Of course, these two inquiries are interdependent, but courts usually
determine whether a defendant has asserted a proper interest, and then whether that interest is
narrowly tailored.
6 The court limited its holding so as to cover only certain promotions made pursuant to
the plan, but did not consider the plan in its entirety. See Dallas Fire Fighters, 150 F.3d at 442.
7 See id. at 441. For a discussion of the court's test, see infra text accompanying notes
59-67.
8 When applying strict scrutiny to the program, the court did not mention whether or not
the compelling interest was satisfied. The only discussion the court provided regarding the com-
pelling interest was its announcement of the proper test. See infra text accompanying notes 59-
67.
9 See Dallas Fire Fighters, 150 F.3d at 441.
'o See id.
" See id. at443.
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A. Round One: The Discrimination Suit
The facts are similar to many affirmative action programs. In
Dallas, the dispute started when minority firefighters filed a class ac-
tion suit against the City of Dallas for racial discrimination in the
Dallas Fire Department ("DFD").1 2 The plaintiffs provided statistical
evidence that African-Americans performed poorly on promotional
tests when compared with Caucasians, and because of the depart-
ment's rank order promotional scheme, African-Americans were not
promoted in the same numbers.1 3 Furthermore, the department's use
of seniority and other promotional criteria, in addition to these test
scores, augmented this underrepresentation. 14 Based on this, the
plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction to bar the fire department
from making promotions based on these criteria. The court, however,
denied their request because they did not make out a prima facie case
of discrimination under Title VII.25 The court cautioned:
[A] bare statistical comparison between the proportion of a
company's minority workforce and minority supervisors or
white-collar employees will not suffice to establish a prima
facie disparate impact case under Title VII. Plaintiffs must
demonstrate both that specific employment practices have a
disparate racial impact and that those practices caused mi-
nority underrepresentation in the higher employment ranks.16
Although the court denied the injunction, 17 the City offered to settle
the claim by agreement, setting forth a new, non-discriminatory pro-
12 See Black Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 905 F.2d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1990) (plain-
tiffs filed a class action suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). There was no ex-
plicit racial criteria or classification at issue, but the plaintiffs claimed that the promotional
requirements had a disparate impact on minorities, from which a claim of unconstitutional dis-
crimination could be made. See id. at 64-65.
13 See id. at 65.
14 See id. at 65-66. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged "time-in-service" and "time-in-
grade" requirements used in promotion determinations. They also challenged the department's
practice of adding point to promotional test scores based on seniority status, and then placing
candidates on a rank-order promotional eligibility list based solely on this computed score. Id.
at 65.
1s In order to support an affirmative action program with remedial purpose, the proponent
must provide evidence by way of a prima facie statutory or constitutional violation that the past
discrimination which the program attempts to remedy existed. Thus, the court's impression of
the Title VII claim has direct implications as to whether it will accept a remedial program. See
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292 (1986) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also infra
text accompanying note 195.
16 Black Fire Fighters, 905 F.2d at 66 (citation omitted).
17 The district court denied the request for a temporary injunction in an unpublished
opinion and the appellate court subsequently affirmed that denial in the published opinion cited
here. See id. at 63.
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motional procedure. 8 In addition to the above, the resulting compro-
mise settlement called for back pay to the plaintiff class, and promo-
tion of an additional twenty-eight qualified African-American fire-
fighters.
19
DFD has eight levels in its promotional structure, similar to
many municipal police and fire departments.20 And as in many other
departments, once a member has been in a particular position for a
certain period of time, the member may take a test which makes him
or her eligible for promotion to the next level.2 1 Under the compro-
mise settlement, twenty-eight African-American firefighters would be
promoted to the next level even though they would not necessarily
have been promoted based solely on their test scores;22 these are
called "skip promotions." Skip promotions are used in departments
that promote individuals based almost exclusively on a ranked score
on a promotional exam; the non-minority candidate is skipped over in
favor of a lower-scoring minority candidate.23 Officials often claim
that the two individuals are essentially equally qualified, but courts
are hesitant to accept such solutions because the higher scoring can-
didate forms an expectation of promotion based on their superior
score. The other popular system is "banding." With banding, candi-
dates are not promoted based on a ranked score, but rather in which
band, or range of scores, the candidate belongs.24 Within each band,
18 See Black Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 19 F.3d 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1994) (not-
ing that the city reduced eligability requirements and altered its ranking positions).
'9 See Black Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 805 F. Supp. 426, 427-28 (N.D. Tex.
1992).
20 See Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 885 F. Supp. 915, 918-19 (N.D. Tex.
1995) (finding that the eight-level promotional structure consisted of: (1) fire and rescue officer,
(2) driver-engineer (3) lieutenant; (4) captain; (5) battalion chief; (6) deputy chief; (7) assistant
chief; and (8) fire chief). Before the department modified its promotional procedure, the de-
partment had many positions separated into two career paths.
The ranks in the Fire Suppression ladder, in ascending order, were Apprentice Fire
and Rescue Officer, Fire and Rescue Officer, Second Driver, Driver Engineer,
Lieutenant, Captain, and Battalion/Section Chief. The ranks in the Fire Prevention
ladder were Apprentice Fire Prevention Officer, Senior Fire Prevention Officer, Fire
Prevention Lieutenant, Fire Prevention Captain and Fire Prevention Section Chief.
Black Fire Fighters, 19 F.3d at 995 n.1.
21 See id.
22 Specifically, twenty were to be promoted to driver-engineer, seven to "fire" lieutenant,
and one to "fire prevention" lieutenant. Black Fire Fighters, 805 F. Supp. at 428. These promo-
tions were to be made from the effective date of the agreement until December 31, 1995. See
Black Fire Fighters, 19 F.3d at 994.
23 See Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at 918 n.1 ("A skip promotion occurs when an
individual who ranks lower than another is promoted instead of the higher ranked applicant. In
effect, the higher scoring applicant is skipped over in favor of an affirmative action promo-
tion."); see,, e.g., Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 447, 448, 455 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding minority
out of rank promotion); Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13,
14 (st Cir. 1998) (same).
24 See Police Ass'n of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159, 1163-64 (5th
Cir. 1996) (promotions made outside the scope of a decree which set forth an affirmative action
2000]
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candidates are considered equal.25 Thus, banding is more akin to a
minority tie-breaker policy, 26 rather than the promotion of individuals
with lower qualifications which occurs with skip promotions. After
the compromise settlement was created, DFD amended its promo-
tional procedure to constitute a banding process, but at the time the
promotions at issue were made the City followed a skip promotion
procedure. 7
In order to justify these twenty-eight positions filled only by
members of a certain race, the proponents28 of the compromise set-
tlement had to prove that the skip promotions satisfied strict scru-
tiny.2 9 The district court found the compromise settlement unconsti-
tutional,30 because plaintiffs were overcompensated by back pay and
skip promotions, and these skip promotions unnecessarily burdened
the rights of others.31 Also, since the suit was filed, the City had
changed its policy on promotions such that further promotions would
be made in a nondiscriminatory manner, thus the plaintiff class would
banding system ruled unconstitutional). Because banding does not rank individuals, those with
higher ranks do not form an expectation of promotion as they do with a skip promotion system.
Thus, the injury to third parties will be lesser with this sort of program.
25 See id.
26 In other words, the minority candidate would be preferred over the non-minority candi-
date only when the two were equal in all respects.
27 See Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at 922. The City of Dallas later defended its skip
promotion practice by likening it to banding, claiming that the actual score an applicant receives
is tinged with error, so the "real" score is really within a certain area demarcated by two stan-
dard deviations from the "actual" score. Thus, if a lower ranking individual is within the "gray
area" of the skipped individual, there is no constitutional injury. The "gray area" is likened to a
band within a banding system. While this is a valid argument in statistical theory, its applica-
tion to constitutional law is stretched. See id.
28 At this point, the previous litigants, both Black Fire Fighters Association (BFFA) and
the City, were both arguing in support of the settlement against the Dallas Fire Fighters Asso-
ciation (DFFA), an intervening plaintiff representing non-minority fire fighters affected by the
comprimise settlement. See Black Fire Fighters, 805 F. Supp. at 427.
29 See id. at 429 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) and
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion)). The court used a
two-prong test tailored to review of a settlement agreement like the compromise settlement at
issue: they must be fair, adequate, and reasonable, and they must not unreasonably or unlawfully
affect third parties. See id. at 428 (citations omitted). It was under this test that the court reached
the constitutionality of the proposal. See id. (finding that "legal obstacles to prevailing on the
merits" was one element of a larger consideration: whether the proposal was fair, adequate, and
reasonable).
30 The district court was unclear as to why exactly the settlement was unconstitutional, but
it did mention that a court must consider the four factors enumerated in United States v. Para-
dise: "'necessity for relief, the efficacy of alternative remedies, the flexibility and duration of
relief, the relationship of numerical goals to the relevant labor market, and the impact of the
relief on the rights of third parties."' Id. at 429 (quoting United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,
171 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
31 See Black Fire Fighters, 805 F. Supp. at 429. The named plaintiffs were awarded
$822,000 in back pay and attorney's fees in damages, so the plaintiffs were considered ade-
quately compensated for past injuries. See id. at 428.
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have another, fair opportunity for promotion. Furthermore, the skip
promotions unnecessarily burdened the rights of third parties because
the effect on non-protected parties would be "felt for years to come,"
when the plaintiffs had already been adequately compensated
33
Therefore, the court found the plan was not a narrowly tailored rem-
edy, assuming even that there had been actionable past discrimination
in the Dallas Fire Department.34
The City appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the unconstitu-
tionality holding of the district court.35 The appellate court found that
the plan did not pass the required five-factor narrow-tailoring test.
36
The court found it significant that the "agreement requires 28 promo-
tions of 'qualified blacks' without regard to whether the person to be
promoted is a victim of past discrimination." 37 Thus the overbroad
promotional scheme failed the first two factors of the five-factor test:
it was not necessary in light of alternative remedies because the rem-
edy extended beyond the identified class.38 That inquiry out of the
way, the court focused on the relationship of the numerical goals to
the relevant labor market: "does something in the relevant labor mar-
ket justify skip promotion of 'qualified blacks' rather than class
members? '39 It was under this inquiry that the court commented on
the statistical evidence of the department's prior discrimination. The
court felt that the department did not demonstrate their previous dis-
crimination rose to such a level to support the award of promotions:
The Department's behavior does not establish it as the kind
of 'particularly egregious' defendant a court must force to
promote minorities. Since this suit was filed, the department
has eliminated the rank of Second Driver, reduced time-in-
grade requirements for promotion to other ranks, and even
made skip promotions. The city is a willing party to the effort
32 See id. at 429 ("Intervenor urges, and the court agrees, based on the record as it now
stands, that the back pay to be awarded compensates plaintiffs for all past discrimination, mak-
ing the skip promotions a bonus, because plaintiffs are now assured that regular promotions will
be made in a nondiscriminatory manner.") (footnotes omitted).13 Id. at 430.
"' The court found the plan unconstitutional irrespective of whether the city had a relevant
past history of discrimination. See id. at 429.
35 See Black Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 19 F.3d 992 (5th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Dallas I].
.6 The Supreme Court has focused on five factors in analyzing race-conscious remedial
measures: the necessity for relief, the efficacy of alternative remedies, the flexibility and dura-
tion of the relief, the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market, and the
impact of the relief on the rights of third parties. Id. at 995 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (cit-
ing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 170)).
3" Id. (footnotes omitted).
31 See id.
39 id.
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to settle this lawsuit. This record falls short of the employ-
ment practices that have justified broad race-conscious reme-
dies. For example in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,40 the
Court described a dozen year history of special training
classes for whites, violations of court orders, and overt dis-
crimination in the awarding of temporary work permits.
Similarly, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States4l described a pattern of lying to minority applicants
and deliberately losing their applications. This defendant
does not rise to that level.42
Through the practice of ranking of exam scores, the court concluded,
"a firefighter has an expectation that he can earn promotion through
study," and "[tihat expectation is tangible enough that we cannot ig-
nore the problems with the tailoring of this remedy." 43
B. Round Two: The Reverse Discrimination Suit
The minority firefighters were not the only plaintiffs who sued,
however. The same intervening plaintiffs in the former suit also filed
a separate action asserting that the skip promotions violated their
rights under federal and state constitutional law.44 This time, the court
was faced with the effect of the plan on the rights of third parties di-
rectly, whereas beforehand, it had only considered its effect on the
validity of the compromise settlement. Specifically, the plaintiffs
complained that they were unconstitutionally denied promotions to
driver-engineer, lieutenant, and captain due to the settlement, and an-
other group contested the minority deputy chief appointment.45 As
would be expected, the district court again held for the plaintiffs.
46
40 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (imposing consent decree against labor union).
41 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (awarding retroactive seniority to minority truck drivers).
42 Dallas , 19 F.3d at 996 (footnotes omitted); see also infra note 77.
43 Id. at 997.
44 See Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 885 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
The named party was the Dallas Fire Fighters Association (DFFA). In the instant suit, the DFFA
represented Caucasian and Native American firefighters. See id. at 918. The Fifth Circuit com-
mented on this in their earlier opinion. The court approved the intervention of DFFA, despite
their concurrent suit, because the facts were different in the two respective cases. In addition to
the twenty-eight skip promotions of the compromise settlement, the latter reverse discrimination
suit involved voluntary promotions made before the decree. See Dallas 1, 19 F.3d at 995.
45 See Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at 918 n.3; Dallas Fire Fighters, 150 F.3d at
440. In addition to the federal constitutional claim, the DFFA asserted federal statutory and state
constitutional claims that will not be considered here. See Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at
919. Also, the plaintiffs claimed racial and gender discrimination, but only the racial discrimi-
nation claim will be considered here. See id.
46 The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on all counts, except
with respect to the minority promotion to the chief position. See Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F.
Supp. at 919-20. Unlike the other promotions, the minority that was appointed to the chief posi-
tion was not appointed to the post solely because of his race. The court had an affidavit stating
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The City's remedy failed the narrow-tailoring test of United States v.
Paradise47 on almost every count.48
As for the first factor, it was not apparent that the skip promo-
tions were necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination: the
statistical imbalance did not justify the use of skip promotions when
the city's promotion methodology counseled against them. 49 In sup-
port of its claim of necessity, the City "submitted statistics concerning
the representation of minorities in the fire department ranks, lists of
promotional eligibility exams [sic] and the consent decree entered
into between the Justice Department and the City in 1976" to demon-
strate that there was past discrimination. 50 The court felt these pre-
sented a "statistical imbalance," but nothing sufficient to show a
"strong enough basis in evidence to justify skip promotions in the
1990s."5I Additionally, the court found there were alternative reme-
dies to a practice of skip promotions. The court listed examples of the
alternative remedies, although not an exhaustive list, including that
promotion was based solely on an exam that had been validated by
the EEOC, the city offered tutoring on that exam, and seniority was
no longer a part of the exam score.52 These remedies, unlike skip
promotions, did not impinge on the rights of non-minorities.5 The
City had argued that the rights of third parties were not significantly
effected by skip promotions because the results would have been the
same if banding were used from the beginning of the compromise
settlement, but the court labeled it "statistical evidence [that] smacks
that race was only one factor among many considered in making this appointment. See id. at 925
n.17. The appellate court not only agreed with the district court on this matter, but went one step
further and granted summary judgment for the City. Because the plaintiffs argument rested on
the assumption that "any employment decision utilizing the affirmative action plan [was] ille-
gal," they must lose as a matter of law. Dallas Fire Fighters, 150 F.3d at 442. This was not
necessarily because the plaintiffs' assumption was faulty, but rather because the appellate court
had decided not to rule on the validity of the program as a whole. See id.
47 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion).
4s See Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at 919-20. This was the same test used by the
district court in the earlier suit. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34. Interestingly, the
court applied the test of Paradise, yet cited Croson for its authority. The cited portion of
Croson, while it discusses Paradise, does not state the test reproduced in the Fifth Circuit's
opinion. Cf id. at 919-20 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 170))
with Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (a court "look[s] to several factors, including 1) the necessity for
the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; 2) the flexibility and duration of the relief,
including the availability of waiver provisions; 3) the relationship of the numerical goals to the
relevant labor market; and 4) the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.") (internal
quotations omitted).
49 See Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at 921.
50 Id. (footnote omitted).
-11 Id.
-2 See id. at 921-22.
" See id. at 922.
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of hindsight. ' 54 As with the consideration of necessity,55 the court
considered the statistical evidence again in its analysis of the relation-
ship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market: "The per-
centage of qualified individuals in each rank below necessarily fluc-
tuates, the Court does not find how a single broad percentage goal for
each rank can be adequately related to the number of qualified appli-
cants in the appropriate feeder pool. '56 Lastly, the court reiterated that
the denial of promotion had too large an impact on third parties be-
cause the interest in race conscious promotion was not as strong as
the interest of those expecting promotions.57 Therefore, the plan failed
the Paradise narrow-tailoring test.
58
The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo, considering only the out-of-
rank promotions and not the affirmative action plan as a whole.5 9 In a
short opinion, the court agreed that the skip promotions were not a60
narrowly-tailored remedy under Paradise. The court stated that the
proper test for the plaintiffs equal protection challenge was whether
the "racial classification [is] tailored narrowly to serve a compelling
interest."61 Then, the court went on to state that "a governmental body
has a compelling interest in remedying the present effects of past dis-
crimination. 62 In announcing the inquiry to be conducted for strict
scrutiny of remedial programs, the court referred to its earlier decision
in Black Fire Fighters for the proper four-factor test:
In analyzing race-conscious remedial measures we essen-
tially are guided by four factors: (1) necessity for the relief
and efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) flexibility and dura-
tion of the relief; (3) relationship of the numerical goals to
5 Id. at 922 n.13. The court did not, however, discuss the appropriateness of banding as
an alternate remedy. The court was concerned not so much with the resulting fairness in the
numbers, but with the candidate's legitimate expectation of promotion. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
5 See id. The court, when looking at the necessity for relief, balanced the impact the
remedy had on the rights of others against the impact it had on the injured class. See id. at 922.
56 See id. at 923. Cf Dallas , 19 F.3d at 995 (making a similar comparison) with Croson,
488 U.S. at 499 ("The 30% quota cannot in any realistic sense be tied to any injury suffered by
anyone.").
57 See Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at 923. This time, the court made the same in-
quiry under a different factor of its announced test, the "impact of relief." Id.
8 The court found inconclusive the last two issues: whether the plan was of appropriate
duration and sufficiently flexible. See id. at 922-23.
59 Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 150 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 1349 (1999) (hereinafter Dallas 11].
6o See id. at 441. Because the court was reviewing the lower court's decision on summary
judgment, the program failed strict scrutiny as a matter of law. See id. at 440.
61 Id. at 440.
62 Id. at 441.
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the relevant labor market; and (4) impact of the relief on the
rights of third parties.63
After announcing this test, however, the court did not refer to it at all
during its application. The court opened its discussion of the uncon-
stitutionality of Dallas' remedy with the insufficiency of the evidence
of past discrimination, but did not state whether the evidence was in-
sufficient to demonstrate the necessity for relief, the relationship of
the numerical goals to the labor market, or some other factor. The
court simply noted:
The only evidence of discrimination contained in the record
is the 1976 consent decree between the City and the United
States Department of Justice, precipitated by DOJ finding
that the City engaged in practices inconsistent with Title VII,
and a statistical analysis showing .an underrepresentation of
minorities in the ranks to which the challenged promotions
were made. The record is devoid of proof of a history of
egregious and pervasive discrimination or resistance to af-
firmative action that has warranted more serious measures in
other cases.64
According to the court, the program failed due to the lack of evidence
of remediable past discrimination. 65 Nevertheless, even though it had
determined there was no past discrimination in the DFD, the court felt
there were other ways of remedying past discrimination if it did ex-
ist.66 'That minorities continue to be underrepresented does not nec-
essarily mean that the alternative remedies have been ineffective, but
merely that they apparently do not operate as quickly as out-of-rank
promotions."
67
63 Id. at 441 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (4-justice plurality);
Dallas I, 19 F.3d 992 (5th Cir. 1994)).
64 Dallas II, 150 F.3d at 441 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167 (finding "pervasive, sys-
tematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" which "created a profound need and a firm justi-
fication for the race-conscious relief ordered by the District Court"); Local 28 of the Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 421 (1986) (upholding race-based remedy
where there was egregious record of discrimination and official resistance to practices aimed at
ending discrimination); Dallas I, 19 F.3d at 996 (contrasting the DFD's employment practices
with that found in Sheet Metal Workers and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), where there was "a pattern of lying to minority applicants and
deliberately losing their applications").
6S See Dallas 11, 150 F.3d at 441.
66 Although the program did not place as heavy a burden on third parties as layoffs would,
the court still found there were better available remedies than skip promotions. See id.
67 Id. (footnote omitted). The terms "out-of-rank promotions" and "skip promotions" are
synonymous.
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The City appealed yet again, but the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari.68 In a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer ex-
pressed disagreement with the court of appeals, and with the majority
of the Court for denying certiorari. Breyer stated that the means of
proving remediable past discrimination was an important disagree-
ment among circuits that the Court should have resolved.69 He be-
lieved that there was evidence of past racial discrimination by DFD,
citing six facts that could lead a reasonable jury to find so:
The defendants offered the following evidence of past dis-
crimination in support of the plan: (1) The Dallas Fire De-
partment did not hire its first black firefighter until 1969. (2)
Blacks and Latinos comprised less than 1 percent of the fire
department in 1972. (3) In 1972, the Department of Justice
concluded that the fire department had engaged in impermis-
sible racial discrimination. (4) In 1976, the Dallas Fire De-
partment entered into a consent decree with the Department
of Justice "to alleviate the effects of any past discrimination
that might have occurred." (5) The consent decree and subse-
quent plans led to advances in the hiring of minorities and
women, and, in 1988, 38.7 percent of the entry-level "fire
and rescue officers" were black or Latino and 1.9 percent
were women. (6) In the upper ranks of the fire department, in
1988, blacks and Latinos made up 14.8 percent of the
"driver-engineers," 5.8 percent of the "lieutenants," and 5.2
percent of the "executives/deputy chiefs." Women made up
1.6 of the "driver-engineers," but there were no women
"lieutenants" or "executives/deputy chiefs." 70
He issued a reminder that statistical disparities, although not suffi-
cient on their own, may be used to show discrimination, and "[i]n this
case, there are both statistics and other evidentiary indicia of past dis-
crimination, including a finding by the Department of Justice of a
history of discrimination.'
II. THE CURRENT STANCE OF THE COURT
The leading case on affirmative action programs to remedy past
discrimination is, surprisingly, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.72
Although Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena73 is the watershed case
(' City of Dallas v. Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 1349 (1999).
69 See id. at 1349 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (citations omitted).
71 See id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-02).
72 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
73 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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that decided the proper level of inquiry for "benign" 74 discrimination,
it was in Croson that the Court announced the standard lower courts
follow today.75 Before discussing Croson, however, it is first neces-
sary to understand a little about the case law upon which it is based:
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,76 which introduced the com-
pelling interest that the City asserted in Dallas, and United States v.
Paradise,77 which the Dallas court relied on heavily in assessing the
constitutionality of the measure.
A. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
Past discrimination as a justification for affirmative action in the
employment context was first squarely confronted in Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education.78 There, an affirmative action plan by the
school board mandated that teacher layoffs be tailored to retain the
percentage of minority faculty present at the time the layoff was initi-
ated.79 Rather than lay off tenured non-minority teachers in the stead
74 "Benign" is a term of art referring to racial discrimination that arises out of a desire to
help minorities overcome historical vestiges of discrimination. It is viewed by its supporters as
the opposite of invidious discrimination, a term of art referring to racial classifications resulting
of stereotypical and/or pejorative views of minorities. Proponents of affirmative action pro-
grams claim that this type of racial classification does not carry the same stigmatic problems
endemic to most racial classifications attacked during the Civil Rights movement.
75 Although Adarand, decided in 1995, is the latest case settling the legal doctrine of
affirmative action, the bulk of the Adarand opinion was concerned with clarifying why strict
scrutiny was the proper test, but did not go into the specifics that Croson did. See Jennifer R.
Byrne, Comment, Toward a Colorblind Constitution: Justice O'Connor's Narrowing of Af-
firmative Action, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 619, 634 (1998) (stating that Croson represents a turning
point in affirmative action jurisprudence because the Court finally agreed enough on its applica-
tion of scrutiny to provide a "template for evaluating the validity of racial classifications").
76 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
7 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion).
78 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion). That same year, the court briefly addressed
programs to remedy past discrimination in the frequently cited case Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (under Title VII and the federal Constitu-
tion, labor union challenged a court-ordered affirmative action program which created a 30%
minority hiring goal to be achieved by a set date), finding the showing of past discrimination
clearly sufficient to satisfy any test. See id. at 480-81 ("In this case, there is no problem, as there
was in Wygant, with a proper showing of prior discrimination that would justify the use of re-
medial racial classifications. Both the District Court and Court of Appeals have repeatedly
found petitioners guilty of egregious violations of Title VII and have determined that affirma-
tive measures were necessary to remedy their discriminatory practices."). In its statement of
facts, the court noted that the union had almost no minority members, see id. at 428, persisted in
its refusal to admit minorities by claiming that minorities received "unfair tutoring" on their
entrance exams, see id., and refused to organize a local industry composed of mostly minorities.
See id. at 430.
79 See WVygant, 476 U.S. at 270. The layoff plan was included in a collective bargaining
agreement drawn up "because of racial tension in the community." Id. After minority teachers
alleged employment discrimination, the Board settled the complaint by agreeing to comply with
the terms of an order of adjustment issued by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. See id. at
267 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The layoff policy was instituted to ensure that any layoffs, if they
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of minority teachers still within their probationary periods, the school
board chose not to follow the plan. ° In response, the teacher union
and two minority teachers filed suit.81 Although the Court had not yet
settled on strict scrutiny for benign discrimination, the plurality ap-
plied that standard in Wygant.82 In support of its racial preference, the
school board had asserted two compelling interests: providing minor-
ity role models for students and alleviation of societal discrimina-
tion.83 The Court, however, ruled those interests not sufficiently com-
pelling to satisfy strict scrutiny.84 Realizing that these arguments
might fail, the school had also asserted that alleviation of past dis-
crimination by the school itself was a purpose behind the statute.!
5
The Court did not summarily reject it, as with the other justifications,
but did state that the school must have firm evidentiary support for
such a claim:
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action is
warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is
challenged in court by nonminority employees.... In such a
case, the trial court must make a factual determination that
the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion
that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate burden re-
became necessary, did not eliminate the new positions that minorities had recently fought for
and won. See id. at 298-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80 See id. The school board retained a lower percentage of minority teachers and retained,
instead, tenured non-minority teachers. See id.
8' See id.
8 See id. at 273 ("The Court has recognized that the level of scrutiny does not change
merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not
been subject to governmental discrimination.") (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982) (ruling school's female-only nursing program unconstitutional due
to interference with equal protection rights of males)).
8' See id. at 275.
84 See id. Alleviation of societal discrimination-had been asserted in prior cases. Societal
discrimination had been described in Bakke as an "amorphous concept of injury that may be
ageless in its reach into the past." Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
307 (1978) (sixteen-seat minority set-aside at University of California at Davis Medical School).
Since Bakke, the Court has been critical of programs to remedy societal discrimination, because
assertions based on such an interest are typically unsupported by specific facts. Generally, liti-
gants have not successfully created a causal link between any specific societal discrimination
and present effects addressed by affirmative action programs, but Justice O'Connor has care-
fully left the avenue open:
[lI]f the city could show that it had essentially become a 'passive participant' in a
system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry,
we think it clear that the court could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a sys-
tem. It is beyond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a compelling
interest in assuring that public dollars ... do not serve to finance the evil of private
prejudice.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,492 (1989).
85 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,277 (1986) ("Respondents also now
argue that their purpose in adopting the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination
against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring teachers.").
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mains with the employees to demonstrate the unconstitution-
ality of an affirmative-action program. But unless such a de-
termination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge
by nonminority employees to remedial action cannot deter-
mine whether the race-based action is justified as a remedy
for prior discrimination.
86
The board claimed the program was based on past discrimination by
the school, but had provided no evidence in support of that assertion
that the Court could hang its hat on. The Court pointed to the lower
court's finding that the statistical disparities the school now relied
upon as evidence of its own past discrimination had already been de-
termined to be the result of societal discrimination. 87 Societal dis-
crimination, as defined by the Court, is discrimination that occurs on
such a scale that it does not have a "firm evidentiary basis" for its
scope or genesis. 88 Therefore, the plan was left totally without justifi-
cation. Due to the complete failure of the board to provide evidence
even approaching a "strong basis in evidence," the Court did not de-
tail what factual findings may be sufficient.89 The Court could have
clarified this point, or even remanded for these factual findings, but
instead chose to simply strike the program. Justice Marshall dissented
for this reason: The district court did not permit the evidentiary sup-
port the Court later claimed was lacking, thus the majority should
have remanded on that issue.90 Justice O'Connor, however, provided
some guidance in her concurrence, which later courts have fol-
lowed,91 as to what the Wygant plurality may have meant by requiring
a firm evidentiary basis. She stated that findings of past or present
discrimination need not be accompanied by findings of actual dis-
86 Id. at 277-78.
87 See id. at 278. The district court had found there was no history of overt discrimination
by the school to support its racial preference, but had upheld the plan for purposes of providing
minority role models and alleviating societal discrimination. See id. at 272.
" See supra note 84. This is not to say that an assertion of 'societal discrimination' could
not be stated with particularity. It is only generalized assertions of societal discrimination, made
because of the paucity of particularized proof of past discrimination by a particular entity, that
cannot be substituted as a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny standard.
89 The Court did not rest its holding on this point. Instead, it found the means used were
not narrowly-tailored because, rather than using a hiring goal, the Board used layoffs which
burdened innocent individuals. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83.
90 See id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also dissented with respect to
the narrow tailoring of the program. He concluded that the layoffs were indeed unfair, but not
unconstitutional given the detailed factual history of the case as he recounted. See id. at 296-99.
91 Justice Powell, with Justices Burger and Rehnquist, wrote the Wygant opinion, which
was also joined by Justice O'Connor, who also wrote her own concurrence. See id. at 269.
Justice White provided the necessary fifth vote, but he only went as far as to concur that the plan
was "unconstitutional." See id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring).
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crimination, so long as the actor has a firm basis for believing that
remedial action is required.9 z
B. United States v. Paradise
After Wygant, the Court was again confronted with a program to
remedy past discrimination in United States v. Paradise.93 In Para-
dise, the Alabama police force was forced to impose a 50% minority
promotion requirement to remedy past discrimination by the depart-
ment pursuant to previously imposed judicial decrees. 94 The district
court9 made a strong argument in support of its claim of past dis-
crimination. First, in its 37-year history the department had not one
African-American police officer. 96 Because of this past discrimina-
tion, there were absolutely no African-American officers in any of the
higher ranks (i.e. corporal and above) even in 1978.97 Furthermore, by
failing to comply with prior court orders of 1979 and 1981, the de-
partment had continued and augmented these injuries. 98 On the con-
stitutional validity of the remedial 50% quota, the Court uttered this
oft quoted phrase: "The Government unquestionably has a compelling
interest in remedying past and present discrimination by a state ac-
tor."99 Because the past and present discrimination in Alabama's po-
lice department was so obvious and overwhelming, however, the
92 See id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("This remedial purpose need not be accom-
panied by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as
long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required."). In his
dissent, Marshall made a stronger argument on the same point; "formal findings of past dis-
crimination are not a necessary predicate to the adoption of affirmative action policies, and that
the scope of such policies need not be limited to remedying specific instances of identifiable
discrimination." id. at 305.
93 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion).
94 See id. at 154-55. The fact that Paradise concerned a judicially imposed decree has
some factual significance. Affirmative action programs are usually the result of three things:
voluntary programs, consent decrees, and judicial decrees. See Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933
F.2d 1448, 1459 (8th Cir. 1991). Voluntary programs are those initiated in total by the depart-
ment of actors themselves. See id. Judicial decrees are remedial plans imposed by a court after a
finding of discrimination. See id. Consent decrees are somewhere in between the two: they are
somewhat like contracts, but they are also subject to court approval before they can take effect.
See id. All three types are subject to the same constitutional test, but the reasons for which the
program was created have a significant effect on the types of evidence available to the court
when judging the sufficiency of the remedial purpose. Obviously, voluntarily administered
programs will have much less evidentiary proof, on average, than programs resulting from
findings that, via decree, are already of record.
95 Past discrimination was not proven by the department seeking to validate a voluntary
affirmative action program, but by the district court upholding consent decrees previously im-
posed on the department by court order to remedy discrimination found to exist against minority
plaintiffs.
96 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 168.
9' See id. at 169.
" See id. at 164.
99 Id. at 167 (citing cases).
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Court again did not enumerate exactly what showing of past discrimi-
nation was required to justify such a strict remedy.1 ° It simply stated
that, "[i]n this case[,] the judicial determinations of prior discrimina-
tory policies and conduct satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test.",101
The Court found the remedy satisfied the second prong of strict
scrutiny as well, announcing the test for the narrow-tailoring of reme-
dial programs: a court "look[s] to several factors, including 1) the ne-
cessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; 2) the
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of
waiver provisions; 3) the relationship of the numerical goals to the
relevant labor market; and 4) the impact of the relief on the rights of
third parties." 102 Then, the Court went through these factors as they
applied to the facts in Paradise. First, the remedy was deemed neces-
sary because, in short, the governmental interest involved had become
urgent due to delay, and all other lesser remedies had been tried and
had not worked. 10 3 The department's history of compliance was so
dismal that the Court simply concluded it was doubtful the district
court had any other choice but to institute a 50% promotion require-
ment1 °4 Second, the requirement was limited in application with ap-
propriate waiver provisions, such that it was satisfied the second re-
quirement.1°5 Third, the numerical relationship between the problem
and relief ordered was not problematic. The goal of 25% minority in
upper ranks, achieved through a one-for-one promotional scheme,
was plainly justified in light of the 25% minority in the relevant labor
pool. 06 Though* the relief called for 50% minority promotions, the
Court compared the remedy to Sheet Metal Workers,07 another case
where continuous, obstinate refusal to comply with court orders re-
quired drastic remedial measures. 10 8 Lastly, the program was not an
'D' See id. ("As the United States concedes ... the pervasive, systematic, and obstinate
discriminatory conduct of the Department created a profound need and a firm justification for
the race-conscious relief ordered by the District Court.").
'0' Id.atl67n.18.
102 Id. at 171 (quoting Local 28 of the Sheet Metal workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 481 (1986) (holding 30% minority goal was narrowly tailored because it was neces-
sary considering the efficacy of alternative remedies, the orders were temporary, and the impact
on white workers was marginal)).
103 See id. at 171-177 (outlining the factual history of other ineffective proposed remedies,
and the obstinate refusal to comply demonstrated by the department).
104 See id. at 177 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 486).
105 See id. at 177-78.
i"6 See id. at 180.
107 The 50% requirement was the mandated speed at which the 25% goal was to be
achieved. See id. This was compared to the mandated end-date set for the remedy in Sheet Metal
Workers. See supra note 78.
"" See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 180.
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absolute bar to white advancement, and not as severe as a layoff pro-
vision, so it did not unduly harm innocent third parties.0 9
C. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
Finally, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,110 the Court ap-
plied Wygant and Paradise to a set-aside program in Richmond, Vir-
ginia. The Court found the plan could not stand because there was no
direct evidence that Richmond had previously discriminated against
Minority Business Enterprises ("MBEs")."' Comparison of the sta-
tistical evidence of minority participation versus the City's minority
population was insufficient because it did not compare the relevant
labor pool. 1 2 But if the statistical evidence could be tied to the local
MBEs eligible, rather than the minority population in the city, then
"an inference of past discrimination could arise."113
Commenting on whether Richmond's asserted past discrimina-
tion constituted a compelling interest, the Court stated that the past
discrimination must provide a "'strong basis in evidence for its con-
clusion that remedial action was necessary,"' and "[t]here is nothing
approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory viola-
tion by anyone in the Richmond construction industry." 14 This is the
hard-and-fast rule that subsequent precedent has relied upon, but the
rest of the decision was carefully limited to the particular facts of
Croson, rather than as an explanation of the new rule. This lack of
clarity has created an important problem in affirmative action juris-
prudence. The court did not give any guidance as to what factual
showing will provide a strong basis in evidence and for what exactly
that showing is meant. The remedial discrimination cases before
Croson involved past discrimination so "egregious" that there was no
need to inquire about a standard of evidence to prove that past dis-
crimination existed, or that it had present effects."l 5 In Croson, the
'09 See id. at 182-83.
10 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Ul See id. at 498-99.
12 See id. at 498, 501-02. The Court mentions the inadequacy of the statistical evidence
again in a discussion of the narrow tailoring of the plan. See id. at 507.
"' See id. at 503.
14 Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277) (citations omitted).
..5 Both Paradise and Sheet Metal, for example, involved cases where the absence of past
discrimination could not seriously be argued. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 169 (finding that the
Alabama Department of Public Safety agreed to remedy discriminatory practices only after
repeated allegation of discrimination and imposition of numerous decrees, and then did not
follow through on its promises); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 427-31 (noting that the union
admitted members on a nepotistic basis that operated to exclude minorities, stopped processing
apprentice applications to avoid including minorities, ignored minority selection tests because
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Court did not require an evidentiary showing, but found Richmond's
program inadequate based on its own particular facts. Richmond's
reliance on congressional findings regarding national discrimination
in the construction industry, and the improper statistical comparisons
of Richmond's minority population to minority contract awards
amounted to insufficient evidence that Richmond itself had discrimi-
nated. Therefore, the Court did not reach the larger issue of what af-
firmative action proponents, in general, have to show to meet this re-
quirement. Regardless, this requirement-that there must be a strong
basis in evidence of past discrimination-has assumed a biblical im-
portance in later affirmative action jurisprudence.
I. THE DALLAS OPINION TYPIFIES THE LOWER COURTS' STRUGGLE
WITH THE PROPER REMEDIAL STANDARD
A. An Outline of the Problem Presented to Lower Circuits
The general rules announced above were instrumental to the
Fifth Circuit in Dallas, but they have also formed the doctrinal basis
for other circuits faced with affirmative action programs in hiring and
promotions in governmental departments. When the Fifth Circuit
ruled on Dallas' plan, it not only had the decisions of Wygant, Para-
dise, and Croson as guidelines, but also a plethora of lower court
opinions confronting issues similar to those in Dallas.
The primary confusion lower courts have had applying Croson's
legacy to affirmative action programs has been: What exactly is past
discrimination and how do you prove it? Unsure of the parameters of
the strong basis in evidence standard, lower courts have somewhat
differing conceptions of what constitutes actionable past discrimina-
tion in the affirmative action context. The Seventh Circuit in Billish v.
City of Chicago,'16 a case also involving affirmative action in fire de-
partment promotions, provides a good example of the underlying
problems in many post-Croson cases. The Chicago Fire Department
promoted two minority candidates out of rank in order to include mi-
nority candidates among those promoted." 7 The court stated:
they received 'unfair tutoring,' selectively organized only non-minority shops, provided training
programs only for non-minorities, and favored non-minorities in transfer applications). Wygant,
on the other hand, was a case where the record contained virtually no evidence of any past dis-
crimination.
116 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1993) (remanding this reverse discrimination suit to the trail
court for review under the strict scrutiny standard).
"7 See id. at 892.
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Although there has never been a formal judicial determina-
tion that the Chicago Fire Department ever discriminated in
favor of whites, we do not understand the plaintiffs to deny
that... the department was in violation of [Title VD] under a
"disparate impact" theory of discrimination .... Assuming,
then, that there was actionable discrimination in favor of
whites in hiring from 1972 to 1974 and in promotions from
1972 to 1980, we come to the question of the appropriateness
of the fire commissioner's actions in 1987 as measures for
rectifying that discrimination.
i s
Whether "past discrimination" in the affirmative action context is
limited to actionable discrimination, the court did not say. Also, the
court did not rule on whether statistical disparity provided a strong
basis in evidence of past discrimination justifying the out-of-rank
promotions, but remanded without guidance as a factual determina-
tion for the trial court.'
9
In a nutshell, these are the precise issues that have plagued courts
across the country forced to deal with the legitimacy of affirmative
action programs. Public employers and educators have been placed in
a similar situation: a dramatic shift in racial politics from 1965 to
1975 meant that dramatic changes had to be made in the workplace.
Some had come to take responsibility for their racial homogeneity
and instituted voluntary programs, and others did not. Of those that
did not, some were subjected to affirmative action programs by court
order. Therefore, the issue presented by the Seventh Circuit in Billish
typifies the legal problem posed to public schools and police and fire
"'s Id. at 893.
119 See id. at 895. This is the disturbing legacy of Croson: courts sidestep the issue by
calling it a factual one for the trial court. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 693 ("The Croson court
made a substantive choice to be fact specific. Lower courts since Croson have implicitly com-
pared the constitutionality of their programs to how similar or dissimilar the program at bar is to
the Richmond plan, going directly against the methodology prescribed in Croson."); see also
Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1996) (striking a quota system after suit by
non-minority police officers). In that case, the court supported its choice of which Supreme
Court case to use as a backdrop for its analysis by how factually similar it was to the city's
program:
As a preliminary matter, we note that this appeal is from a plan that a municipality
has voluntarily adopted on its own initiative. Thus, this plan differs from those that
are crafted under the direction of a court order, resulting from a judicial factfinding
process, as happened in [Paradise]. Nor was this plan presented to a court by the
participating parties as part of a motion for a judicially approved consent decree, as
was the case in [Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th
Cir. 1985), affid sub nom. Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501 (1986)]. Rather, this plan, much like the one adopted in [Croson], for
awarding city contracts to minority business enterprises, has been voluntarily con-
ceived in the course of a local government's political process.
Middleton, 92 F.3d at 401 (citations omitted). The court compared the Croson decision to the
facts of the case, finding Flint's remedial program unconstitutional. See id. at 413.
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departments in this country. On one hand, they have the possibility
that minority plaintiffs will sue for racial discrimination in hiring,
promotions, curriculum, etc. On the other hand, they have the possi-
bility that non-minority plaintiffs will sue for a job, promotion, or
benefit they expected but did not receive because of a remedial pro-
gram.120 In the middle, they have the vague legal guideline announced
by the Court. The key to finding this middle ground has been the evi-
dentiary support tying present effects to past discrimination, but
courts and government actors cannot settle on what evidentiary
showing is sufficient, and what that evidence is supposed to represent.
Many courts, like the Billish court, characterize the problem with
clarity, but then, just as the Supreme Court has done, lose it all when
applying legal doctrine to the issue.
As the circuits have struggled with this problem, the resulting
body of law has not resolved these important questions. In Paradise,
the Court-stated remedy of "past and present discrimination" is un-
questionably compelling. But what does the Court mean by "past and
present discrimination?" Does the "strong basis in evidence" required
by the Court mean there must be some overt measure of an actor's
discrimination before racial preferences can be used? Usually, some
discriminatory practice of the past is tied via statistical evidence to
performance in the present. How strong does the statistical evidence
have to be before the inference of discrimination is raised? Some cir-
cuits require clear proof of the causal connection between past dis-
crimination and present effects, while others let an inference suffice.
When the Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to review
the Fifth Circuit's decision regarding Dallas' affirmative action pro-
gram, it sacrificed an opportunity to clarify these issues. Many courts
faced with the issue have expressed the need for clarity, or made as-
sumptions to fill legal gaps. In Dallas, the Court was petitioned by yet
another circuit forging its own path on what constitutes remediable
past discrimination and the standard required to prove it, yet denied
review as it had done with numerous others.2' Furthermore, the solu-
120 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 291 ("As is illustrated by this case, public employers are
trapped between the competing hazards of liability to minorities of-affirmative action is not
taken to remedy apparent employment discrimination and liability to nonminorities if affirma-
tive action is taken.") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121 See McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 981 (1998); Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1196 (1997); Contractor's Ass'n of E. Pennsylvania v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586 (3rd.
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1113 (1997); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied sub nom Thurgood Marshall Legal Soc'y v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996);
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995); Billish
v. City of Chicago, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993); Stuart v.
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tion proposed by the Fifth Circuit breaks with current trends on the
basic structure of the constitutional test under which affirmative ac-
tion programs are analyzed.
B. The Unquestionably Compelling Remedial Interest
What is the strong basis in evidence demanded by Croson? The
compelling justification announced in Wygant has been twisted and
turned to mean different things, mostly because the Court itself was
uncertain. After Wygant, the Court did not clarify its unquestionably
compelling interest in Paradise or Croson. In Wygant, the compelling
interest originally offered by those in favor of the program was "pro-
viding minority role models for its minority students, as an attempt to
alleviate the effects of societal discrimination," and not any specific
past practice either within the school, or that had a tangible effect on
school procedures. 122 The court stated that societal discrimination,
"without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially clas-
sified remedy,"'123 but the Court did not clarify why, besides lack of
evidence, this is so.
Furthermore, the Court merely stated that the school had not met
its evidentiary burden to prove that the school itself had discriminated
in the past, but did not define what "past discrimination" a school's or
any other actor's affirmative action program may constitutionally ad-
dress. 124 How severe or closely tied with past practices the alleged
discrimination had to be was not addressed. Croson relies on
Wygant's confusion in this respect: the Court cites Wygant for the
proper test and to compare the deficiencies in Wygant with those of
Croson, adding nothing to the discussion of "past discrimination" as
envisioned by Wygant.'25 The Paradise Court did not comment on the
issue because, in that case, the existence of past and present discrimi-
nation, as well as its effects on the department's minority employees,
could not seriously be questioned. In sum, the only thing that seems
settled regarding past discrimination is Wygant's original assertion
that it is "unquestionably compelling."
It would seem that the definition of past discrimination is obvi-
ous. The concepts of "prejudice" and "discrimination" are not new to
this country. And given our history, it is not far-fetched to assume
Roache, 951 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 913 (1992); Coral Const. Co. v.
King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992).
'22 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
'23 Id. at 276.
124 See id. at 277-78 (noting that the trial court made no factual determination as to past
discrimination and that the Board had repeatedly asserted in earlier stages of litigation that it did
not discriminate in hiring).
125 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,494,497-501 (1989).
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that most institutions have a history of pervasive discrimination
against African-Americans. Thus, it would not be surprising for a
court to simply assume that, whatever the defendant in their court-
room, that defendant probably has a history of past discrimination.
For the sake of argument, this could be what the Court meant when it
stated that the remedy of past discrimination is an interest that is,
without question, compelling. The issue would thus be phrased, not
whether there was past discrimination to remedy, but simply rather
whether the remedy was appropriately tailored to the prior discrimi-
nation. This is not, however, why some courts mention past discrimi-
nation only briefly, note that it is unquestionably compelling, then
move on to narrow-tailoring requirements. 126 Lower courts are simply
following the unofficial mandate of the Supreme Court and bypassing
the inquiry entirely, since the issue is such a troublesome one. 27 After
all, if it is true that the program is not narrowly tailored, then whether
it is supported by a compelling interest becomes moot.
While the "egregious" facts of prior Supreme Court cases per-
mitted such avoidance, most current cases do not. Past discrimination
is "unquestionably compelling," but there is no reason for a court to
assume that past discrimination is the true purpose behind a program
when there may have been another, true purpose. In strict scrutiny
analysis, someone making a racial classification cannot simply an-
nounce to the court that they have discriminated in the past and that
their purpose is to remedy it: they have to prove it. 28 Courts should,
then, define what the "it" is that must be proven, and then how to
prove it. Without a clear demarcation of the scope of the past dis-
crimination that may be remedied, courts will continue to have diffi-
culty asserting valid compelling interests.
Most courts have concentrated only on the evidence a defendant
must meet to demonstrate past discrimination, but the Fifth Circuit
126 This is exactly what the Dallas court did, but that court based a significant portion of its
holding on the belief that there was no past discrimination in DFD. See Dallas II, 150 F.3d at
441.
127 See, e.g., People Who Care v. Rokford Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. No. 205, 111 F.3d 528
(7th Cir. 1997) (striking a remedial decree on piecemeal basis without analyzing school's claim
of past discrimination as a compelling interest). Moreover, some courts have neglected to follow
a clear strict scrutiny test entirely. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963
F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (granting summary judgment for the company, and analyzing the
minority set-aside without a clear delineation of the standard, but instead on a fact-specific
basis).
12" Unless, of course, the actor is merely complying with a mandatory decree imposed by a
court which, itself, is formulated to remedy past discrimination. In such an instance, some courts
have found that compliance with a court order alone is a compelling interest. See Citizens Con-
cemed About Our Children v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 193 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.
1999) (finding that compliance with a consent decree alone is compelling when the school board
would be subjected to contempt for not complying with the order).
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has provided an explanation of what "past discrimination" entails.
The court considered compelling interests in affirmative action pro-
grams in the context of the University of Texas Law School admis-
sions policy in Hopwood v. Texas.129 The state offered diversity and
past discrimination as compelling interests supporting the program,1
30
but the court ruled that diversity was not compelling. 13  As for past
discrimination, the court stated that in order to justify affirmative ac-
tion programs there must be present effects of past discrimination,
and the affirmative action program must be adopted to remedy these
present effects. 132 To prove the present effect to be addressed reme-
dies past discrimination, the proponent must provide a causal link
between the two.133 The court struck the program because this link
was not established. 134 Discrimination by the law school had occurred
so far in the past that the court found it was unrelated to the present
educational environment. Sweatt v. Painter35 struck down segrega-
tion in the UT law school, and "any other discrimination by the law
school ended in the 1960s.,,136 Moreover, the district court "squarely
found that 'in recent history, there is no evidence of overt, officially
sanctioned discrimination at the University of Texas."" 137 Thus, it
seems that the Fifth Circuit is quite limited with respect to what past
discrimination affirmative action programs may address: overt, offi-
cially sanctioned discrimination that, at UT, has not occurred since
Sweatt v. Painter.
38
'29 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (striking school admissions program that had substantial
preferences for Mexican-Americans and African-Americans such that their applications were
considered separately from other applications).
130 See id. at 938.
131 See id. at 944 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493). The court said that in the diversity con-
text, applicants are preferred over others based on stereotypical character traits that ate assumed
to go along with their racial classification, which is forbidden under the Constitution: See id. at
946, 948. This is a controversial holding that may be questionable in light of Supreme Court
precedent. See Stephanie E. Straub, Note, The Wisdom and Constitutionality of Race-Based
Decision Making in Higher Education Admissions Programs: A Critical Look at Hopwood v.
Texas, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 133 (1997).
132 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952 (quoting Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153). The court also
stressed that the lav school could not remedy discrimination on the part of the entire University
of Texas school system, but only that of the law school itself. See id.
133 See id. ("[The law school must show that it adopted the program specifically to remedy
the identified present effects for the past discrimination."). See also infra text accompanying
notes 152-157.
134 See id. at 953 ("The vast majority of the faculty, staff, and students as the law school
had absolutely nothing to do with any discrimination that the law school practiced in the past.").
13' 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (milestone case that first seriously questioned the doctrine of
"separate but equal" by ordering the admittance of an African-American applicant to the law
school).
136 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953 (citation omitted).
137 Id. at 954 (quoting Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551,572 (W.D. Tex. 1994)).
138 The court mentioned that there may be "present effects" of this past discrimination that
a defendant may be able to demonstrate, but the school's racial tension was "most certainly the
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The Fifth Circuit has been the only circuit to impose such a
stringent requirement on those proposing remedial programs. The
Dallas court relied on the horrible discriminatory practices evident in
prior Supreme Court cases as a statement that this kind of discrimina-
tion was required to justify remedial programs. The court stated the
evidence of past discrimination simply did not amount to the egre-
gious discrimination of prior cases. Therefore, the program failed. 39
When viewed in light of Hopwood, it becomes clear that this position
contributed to the court's rejection of DFD's program. As in Hop-
wood, the court stated that a sufficient showing of the existence of
past discrimination, meaning overt and officially sanctioned discrimi-
nation, had not been made. This requirement, however, goes much
further than former Court pronouncements. It is clear that in prior
cases, the Court avoided setting any particular standard either because
the case at hand was so "egregious" it did not call for one, or because
there was simply no evidence to support a remedial purpose, but did
not state such a showing was required.14°
In addition, the Fifth Circuit has limited its concept of past
discrimination in another way. The court asserted that passive par-
ticipation in a system of past discrimination by others,14 which has
a concordant present effect, may not be remedied by an affirmative
action program, 142 to which the Fourth Circuit has similarly
agreed. 43 This position can be traced back tc the plurality opinion
in Wygant, which disallowed justifications based on societal dis-
crimination:
This court never has held that societal discrimination alone is
sufficient to justify a raciil classification. Rather, the Court
has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by
the government unit involved before allowing limited use of
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimina-
tion.1
44
Concurring in Wygant, Justice O'Connor agreed that societal dis-
crimination, when defined as discrimination "not traceable to its own
result of present societal discrimination."'Id at 953. Given that past discrimination was deter-
mined to occur almost 40 years prior, the law school was presented with a burden almost impos-
sible to meet.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 40-43, 64-65.
14o See supra text accompanying notes 77, 86-87, 100-101.
141 If the "others" are not identified with particularity, such as discrimination within an
industry or community, then the claim becomes tantamount to a claim based on "societal dis-
crimination."
142 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 942.
143 See Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 155 ("[Slocietal discrimination ... cannot be used as a basis
for supporting a race-conscious remedy.").
14 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274 (1986).
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actions," cannot be compelling.145 Later, however, she stated this
formulation of societal discrimination was false, and thus felt that
findings of discrimination by the affirmative action proponent were
not required. 146 Building on this, Justice O'Connor clearly stated in
her Croson opinion that a finding that one was not an active partici-
pant in past discrimination, but rather contributed by passive partici-
pation in prior discrimination by others, is included in prior discrimi-
nation that may be remedied by affirmative action programs. 47 Thus,
after Croson it is clear that actors do not have to prove they them-
selves discriminated in the past, if they can show that they were as-
sisting others to do so.
The Ninth Circuit has followed O'Connor on this point, ending
up quite friendly to such claims when compared to the Fifth Circuit.
In Associated General Contractors of California v. Coalition for
Economic Equality,148 the City of San Francisco set a percentage of
city contracts aside for minority-, locally-, and women-owned busi-
nesses, asserting past discrimination as a justification for the prefer-
ence. 149 The court noted that an actor need not have been an active
participant in the past discrimination, but a finding of passive partici-
pation in past discrimination of others is sufficient.' 5 According to
the Ninth Circuit, Croson found that "a municipality [such as Rich-
mond] has a compelling interest in redressing, not only discrimination
committed by the municipality, itself, but also discrimination com-
mitted by private parties within the municipality's legislative juris-
diction" as long as the proper causal link is present.' 5' The court then
found sufficient evidence of a link between passive participation such
that it upheld the program.
C. Past Discrimination Tied to a Present Effect:
The Strong Basis In Evidence Standard
Although other circuits do not necessarily agree with the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of actionable past discrimination, they are at
5 Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146 See id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 ("Thus, if the city could show that it had essentially be-
come a passive participant in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local
construction industry, we think it clear that the city could rake affirmative steps to dismantle
such a system."); Id. at 503 ("[T]he city would have a compelling interest in preventing its tax
dollars from assisting these [trade] organizations in maintaining a racially segregated construc-
tion market.").
148 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991) (denying preliminary injunction to construction workers
challenging minority bid preference).
149 See id. at 1403.
150 See id. at 1413 (citing Coral Const. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 916 (9th Cir.
1991).
151 Id. at 1413 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92, 537-38).
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least in accord that this past discrimination, whatever it might be,
must be linked to a present effect in order for a court to determine
that it is the true purpose behind the classification. In Wessman v
Gittens,152 the First Circuit provided a good example of the in-
quiry: the school must "identify a vestige of bygone discrimination
and provide convincing evidence that ties this vestige to the de
jure segregation of the benighted past."' 53 Whether or not a present
effect "is a vestige of past discrimination depends on whether there
is satisfactory evidence of a causal connection."' 54 If the gap is
caused by societal discrimination, unrelated to any specific activity
of the school, then that discrimination is not "past discrimination"
as envisioned by Croson.155 In Podberesky v. Kirwan,156 the Fourth
Circuit announced a similar theory: 'To have a present effect of
past discrimination sufficient to justify the program, the party
seeking to implement the program must.., prove that the effect it
proffers is caused by the past discrimination and that the effect is
of sufficient magnitude to justify the program."'157
The tie, or causal link between the past and present is what must
be demonstrated by the firm evidentiary basis the court requires. This
"strong basis in evidence" provides the causal link between the past
discrimination and present effect that the affirmative action program
addresses; it is what the actor needs to be assured that the racial cate-
gory will indeed address past discrimination as they say it should.'5 8
"S2 160 F.3d 790 (Ist Cir. 1998) (striking race-conscious school admissions program).
1-3 Id. at 801 (citations omitted). While Wessman dealt with school admissions, that case
provided a good statement of the overarching inquiry for remedial programs.
1I4 Id.
's' See id. at 803. It is unclear whether the court meant to foreclose the possibility that the
school may tie a vestige of bygone discrimination present at the school, and tie that to past so-
cietal discrimination. Most likely, however, the court meant to include only societal discrimina-
tion that could be directly linked to activities at the school. See id. ("[Tihe achievement gap
statistics, by themselves, do not even eliminate the possibility that they are caused by what the
Court terms 'societal discrimination' .... But the achievement gap statistics here fail to [meet
the state actor's burden of production] because it is unclear exactly what causative factors they
measure.") (citations omitted)). The First Circuit found this causative relationship to be quite
important.
"6 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (striking scholarship program for African-Americans be-
cause it did not have a strong basis in evidence to support what the university alleged as effects
of past discrimination and the program was not narrowly-tailored to university's asserted inter-
ests).
157 Id. at 153.
"" It is not, as some have surmised, a strong basis in evidence that past discrimination
existed. In Wygant, the plurality discussed this point in the section on the compelling nature of
the asserted remedial interest. The Court said that the Board "must have sufficient evidence to
justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination." See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
The Fifth Circuit has taken this assertion to the extreme, reducing the requirement to a strong
basis in evidence of overt discrimination. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40. However,
the crux of the problem for the Iygant Court was the causal link between past discrimination
and present effects, and not the existence of past discrimination. There must first be sufficient
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Courts have differed on the level of proof a "strong basis in evidence"
requires, as Justice Breyer noted in Dallas.159 Must the causal link be
conclusively proven, or is a simple inference permitted? For most of
the cases decided since Croson, the view the court takes on this ques-
tion decides the case.
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have asked for much in the way of
a causal link between discrimination and present effects, imposing a
stringent requirement on those arguing for affirmative action pro-
grams. In Middleton v. City of Flint,160 the Sixth Circuit rejected justi-
fications of a voluntary quota in city promotions because the statistics
did not provide the "strong basis in evidence" that Croson requires.
161
To demonstrate its "strong basis in evidence," the city offered prior
judicial findings, anecdotal evidence, and statistical analysis.162
While the anecdotal evidence supported finding a racially discrimi-
natory environment, the court found it did not constitute a strong ba-
sis in evidence all on its own. 163 The court found little similarities
between the anecdotal and statistical evidence, such that it did not
consider whether, together, they demonstrated the required causal
link. Although the city had provided statistical interpretations by the
expert at trial to establish the link between the statistical disparities of
the present and discrimination of the past, this testimony was dis-
missed as too conclusory.164 The court instead surmised that maybe
"the police department of Flint is not the mobility ladder of choice for
the city's minorities."165
The Fourth Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit, has been rather unfor-
giving with statistical evidence linking past discrimination and pres-
evidence of past discrimination to demonstrate a causal link between it and something else. See
id. at 277-78.
' See Dallas Fire Fighters, 119 S. Ct. at 1349 (Breyer, J., concurring).
'6o 92 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1996).
161 See id. at 405.
162 See id. at 404. The city offered the long litigation history surrounding the city's promo-
tional and hiring practices, see id. at 405, anecdotal evidence showing a discriminatory culture
on the police force, see id., and statistical disparities comparing the police department and the
city's labor force. See id, at 405-08.
163 See id. at 405 (quoting O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (35% quota of city contracts to MBEs declared unconstitutional)). The
O'Donnell court had found the statistics did not demonstrate the causal link the city was hoping
for, and listed several other non-actionable possible reasons for the disparity in statistics. See
O'Donnell, 963 F.2d at 426.
164 See Middleton, 92 F.3d at 408. There is an argument that if the court had considered the
statistical evidence in tandem with the anecdotal evidence that attempted to explain it, a clearer
picture would have been created. The court did not see how a particular person's interpretation
of discrimination in a particular instance, combined with statistics with a much broader scope,
could show that the discrimination as described was more endemic than anecdotal. See id. at
406.
165 Id.
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ent effects. Because racial classifications are judged under the most
searching inquiry, "the party seeking to implement the program must,
at a minimum, prove that the effect it proffers is caused by the past
discrimination .... , 66 The court continued, "[t]he effects must them-
selves be examined to see whether they were caused by the past dis-
crimination and whether they are of the type that justifies the pro-
gram."'167 Using this standard the Fourth Circuit found a survey of
student racial attitudes was not sufficiently connected to past dis-
crimination because the court found specific instances of racial back-
lash 168 could be caused by societal discrimination rather than by the
school.169 Statistical data of underrepresentation and attrition at the
school was not proven to be caused by past discrimination of the
school because it could have been caused by "economic or other fac-
tors and not because of past discrimination.,
170
Other circuits are much more lenient on the standard of proof
that must be reached, reaching the exact opposite conclusion in cases
with similar facts. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has allowed a
simple inference to suffice. In McNamara v. City of Chicago,'71 fire-
fighters alleged reverse discrimination in promotion in the CFD.
172
The court found direct evidence of racial discrimination in CFD up to
and into the 1980s, referring specifically to the racial opinions of
senior officials in the department. 1 The court considered it a "proper
inference" that these racial politics were responsible for minority un-
der-representation in the CFD.'74 Unlike the Fourth and Sixth Circuit,
166 See Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153-54.
167 See id. at 154.
166 Racial backlash was not defined by the court, but seems best described as negativity
expressed by minority and non-minority members on campus in response to school administra-
tive decision and campus events. See id.
169 See id. ("The frequency and regularity of the incidents, as well as claimed instances of
backlash to remedial measures, do not necessarily implicate past discrimination on the part of
the University, as opposed to present societal discrimination, which the district court implicitly
held."). Citing Wygant, the court said "societal discrimination [] cannot be used as a basis for
supporting a race-conscious remedy." See id2 at 155 ("There is no doubt that racial tensions still
exist in American society, including the campuses of our institutions of higher learning. How-
ever, these tensions and attitudes are not a sufficient ground for employing a race-conscious
remedy at the University of Maryland.") (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 498).
170 See id. at 156.
'7' 138 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 981 (1998) (upholding affirmative
action policy).
172 The facts of CFD are similar to those of Dallas. Caucasian fire fighters sued the City in
Chicago because African American and Hispanic firefighters had been promoted ahead of them
pursuant to an affirmative action plan, even though the minority firefighters had received lower
scores on the promotional exam than the plaintiffs. See id. at 1221.
' See id. at 1224.
174 See id. The court was clear that it was still referring to the causal link between statistics
and discrimination; it stated that the proper inquiry is whether the increase in minority repre-
sentation caused by the program was a "plausible lower-bound estimate" of the shortfall caused
by intentional discrimination in the past. Id.
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the Seventh Circuit did not require the CFD to prove that negative
official opinion of minorities resulted in unjustified employment deci-
sions, or disprove that other factors may have been the cause. The
Eleventh Circuit has also been lenient on this requirement: stating that
that the strong basis in evidence standard means that the causal link
must be proved by evidence "approaching" a prima facie pattern or
practice of discrimination under Title VII, 175  as mentioned in
Croson,176 but need not be conclusively proven.
177
The First Circuit, one of the most active circuits on affirmative
action programs and consent decrees, has, for the most part, sided
with the more lenient Seventh and Eleventh Circuits on the standard
of evidence. In Stuart v. Roache,178 the court was faced with the
question of whether a consent decree imposed on the Boston Police
Department ("BPD") that favored African-American officers over
Caucasian solely based on race was still legally valid after Croson.
179
In 1978 the force had only one African-American sergeant, although
seventy-two were eligible for promotion to sergeant; the court found
this disparate impact amounted to a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. 180 The plaintiffs contention that this statistical evidence was not
enough to prove discrimination was, according to the court, "a mis-
reading of Croson."'181 The statistics themselves suggested that the
reason Boston had so few African-American sergeants in 1978 was
because, prior to 1970, the force did not hire many minorities, and it
175 Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994). In Peightal, a
white applicant sued because fifty-one minorities hired by Fire Department scored lower on the
applicant exam pursuant to an affirmative action program that set a goal at 70% of the minority
population. See id. at 1549. In supporting the Fire Department's statistics, the court stated that
interpretation of the statistical evidence made out a prima facie case of discrimination, because
the 17.6 standard deviations in the minorities hired from the expected number based on the labor
pool was 'far too large' to occur by chance. See id. at 1556.
176 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-75 (O'Connor J., concur-
ring)).
"n See Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1553-57; see also Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908
F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that the county passed affirmative action MBE law in order to
receive certain federal funds). In that case, the court found that evidence of gross statistical
disparities combined with testimony regarding complaints of discrimination in particular in-
stances provided "more than enough evidence on the question of prior discrimination and need
for racial classification to justify the denial of a motion for summary judgment." Cone Corp.,
908 F.2d at 916. Yet the evidence was exactly the type of evidence that was vigorously rejected
in Middleton. Compare id. at 914-916 with Middleton, 92 F.3d at 404-10 (noting that the city
had provided statistical disparities and anecdotal evidence to tie those statistical disparities to
discrimination, yet considering each element insufficient on its own, and neglecting to see the
relation between the different offerings of evidence).
178 951 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding minority skip promotions pursuant to consent
decree).
179 See id. at 447 (noting that the Boston Police Department had signed a consent decree,
but that after it was already in force the Court decided Croson).
"0 See id. at 450.
'a' Id.
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takes several years to be promoted to such a position. In addition to
the disparate impact in promotions and the past history of entry level
discrimination, the court also considered allegations of discriminatory
promotional examinations and the failure of the department to rebut
these natural inferences of discrimination.182 The court stated that
"even though this prior discrimination accounts for this fact, it does
not justify it.' 8 3 The presumption is, then, that this evidence is suffi-
cient to support the program. Furthermore, the court considered this
evidence together, as a whole unit, before ruling whether the depart-
ment had a strong basis in evidence for remedial action.
184
In Boston Police Superior Officers Federation v. City of Bos-
ton,185 a later case growing out of the same factual dispute, the court
followed the same line of reasoning. The BPD had engaged in en-
trance level testing that favored non-minority officers, resulting in
gross racial disparity in the ranks. 186 The court considered it a proper
inference that the evidence of discrimination concerning promotional
exams for sergeant also applied to lieutenant.1 87 Commenting on sta-
tistical disparity and documented history of discrimination, the court
noted "this connection is explained in part by common sense: once
implemented, fair procedures for choosing low-level employees may
take years to show results in the higher ranks. This is especially so in
light of the difficulty the BPD had in implementing the consent de-
cree."
188
The Fifth Circuit, due to its stubbornness regarding the prelimi-
nary question as to whether past discrimination existed, has not made
12 See id.
"" Id. at 452.
"4 Cf. Middleton, 92 F.3d at 404-10; see also supra notes 160-65, 176 and accompanying
text.
'8s 147 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding again that BPD made a sufficient (i.e. strong basis
in evidence) showing).
'86 See id. at 13.
187 See id. at 20 ("It is obvious that discrimination that prevents blacks from becoming
sergeants will also prevent blacks from reaching the level of lieutenant.").
18 Id. at 22 (emphasis added). It may be that the First Circuit has been a little tougher in
the context of preferences in school admissions. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 806
(1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting the anecdotal evidence of the school superintendent because the su-
perintendent did not demonstrate pervasive discrimination, and was silent as to her purposes in
making observations of teacher conduct). There was a strong dissent in that case, however,
which found that the testimony of the school superintendent and their student performance
expert amply demonstrated the requisite causal links. See id. at 820-28 (Lipez, J., dissenting);
see also May Examination Schools use Racial Preferences in Their Admissions Process?:
Wessmann v. Gittens, 135 ED. LAW. REP. 873, 886 (1999) (noting that the "First Circuit [In
Wessman] refused to view the historical, statistical, and anecdotal evidence presented by the
Committee collectively, but instead fractionated its analysis. If the court had examined the data
presented by the School Committee in a collective manner, it might have concluded that Afri-
can-American and Hispanic students were still suffering from the effects of past discrimina-
tion").
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a clear statement on the level of proof required to demonstrate the
causal link the Supreme Court requires. In Edwards v. City of Hous-
ton,189 the Fifth Circuit stated that the statistical and expert testimony
created "substantial doubt" as to the job-related nature of the chal-
lenged promotion exams, such that the city had a strong basis in evi-
dence to believe that remedial action was necessary.190 But just as the
Supreme Court has done in Paradise and Wygant, the court deftly
avoided the subject in later cases. 191 If Edwards is where the Fifth
Circuit stands, this would seem to place it with the more lenient cir-
cuits, but the Dallas opinion casts some doubt on this assertion. The
court seemed to rule exclusively on the evidence of past discrimina-
tion, 192 without so much as mentioning either Hopwood or Ed-
wards.
193
Because the Fifth Circuit's initial inquiry is so strict, it is un-
likely the latter inquiry, lenient or not, will be reached. Moreover, the
"substantial doubt" standard seems of little use when the court re-
fused to accept statistical disparities in conjunction with an official
past finding of impermissible racial discrimination as evidence that
there even was past discrimination. In other words, when the court
rejected Dallas' plan on the basis that the proponents failed to demon-
strate discrimination, it also rejected the testimony, which would
tie the disparities to earlier findings of discrimination in a court or-
dered consent decree.194 Given that other courts have found the requi-
site causal link existed when interpretive data accompanied statistics
such that those the City of Dallas offered, 95 the Fifth Circuit may be,
in practice, siding more with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.
"9 37 F.3d 1097 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding remedial promotions of African American and
Hispanic police officers pursuant to consent decree).
19o See id. at 1113.
191 For instance, in Police Ass'n of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159
(5th Cir. 1996), the court stated simply that it could not rule on the strength of the evidence of
past discrimination, because the city had provided no evidence. See id. at 1168. Also, in Hop-
wood v. Texas, the court deftly avoided the subject by declaring that there was no recent history
of past discrimination in the University of Texas Law School. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 954
(citations omitted).
192 After listing a host of factors the City offered in support of the plan's narrow tailoring,
the court stated, "[a]lthough those factors support the City's position, they are not enough to
overcome the minimal record evidence of discrimination that is sufficient to support only the
use of less intrusive alternative remedies." Dallas II, 150 F.3d at 441 n.13.
193 This lack of continuity makes it hard for the outsider to determine under what standard
the Fifth Circuit operates. Without a reference to its earlier cases, one cannot know for certain
whether the court is changing course, or whether Edwards is simply to be interpreted within the
framework of these later cases.
194 Cf. Dallas II, 150 F.3d at 441 (rejecting statistics for failing to demonstrate discrimina-
tion) with Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at 921-22 (rejecting statistics based on faulty com-
parisons).
19s See, e.g., Boston Police Superior Officers Federation v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 20
(1-' Cir. 1998).
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If this is the case, it is clear that the Fifth Circuit, along with the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, goes beyond what the Supreme Court re-
quires. The proponent need only present a prima facie case of consti-
tutional violation under Title VII, and tie that to a present effect under
the "strong basis in evidence" standard. After the proponent has done
this, the burden shifts to the plaintiff claiming reverse discrimination
to disprove that remedial purpose. 196 This requirement does not mean
that proponent must disprove every possible cause for the present ef-
fects except for past discrimination.
D. The Proper Constitutional Test for Remedial Programs
Dallas highlights an additional issue regarding evidence justify-
ing remedial programs not apparent in other circuit court opinions:
when an actor has a "strong basis in evidence," which end of strict
scrutiny analysis has he established: the compelling interest standard
or narrow tailoring requirement? The Court did not explicitly state the
proper strict scrutiny test, and by including ingenious wording' 97 it
blurred the line between first and second prong analysis. Since the
"necessity" requirement seems to fit just about anywhere, circuits
have been left to forge the proper test themselves. The Fifth Circuit
has conducted its constitutional test somewhat differently than other
circuits, and with Dallas it was apparent that the Fifth Circuit was
forging new ground. The court found the strong basis in evidence re-
quired by Croson to be part of the Paradise narrow tailoring test,
when all other courts have assumed it to be a part of the compelling
interest standard.
Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Wygant clearly required, as
part of a first prong analysis, that proponents provide evidence that
remedy of past discrimination was the true purpose behind the legis-
lation.19s The plurality, of which Justice O'Connor was a part, re-
quired that an actor have a strong basis in evidence as past of the first
prong analysis, so that a court could be convinced that the remedy of
past discrimination was the true reason such a plan was adopted. If
not, the defendant has not provided a compelling justification. Justice
O'Connor, on the other hand, thought this inquiry was better placed in
the second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis. In her concurrence,
196 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 292-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197 By the use of the word "necessary" in the strong basis in evidence standard, the Court
has confused this requirement with the first of the four narrow-tailoring requirements of Para-
dise. Cf Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 ("[The] trial court must determine that employers had a strong
basis in evidence that remedial action was necessary") with Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (holding
that employers must consider the necessity of relief and efficacy of alternative remedies).
9 The Court rejected the Jackson School Board's assertion of remedial purpose because
they provided no evidence to support it. See Wygant, 480 U.S. at 277-78.
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she stated that the real issue concerning evidence of past discrimina-
tion was the fit between. this declared purpose and the ends pur-
sued.199 As appellate courts have tried to interpret Wygant and its
progeny, the lack of consensus has proven somewhat confusing.2°
Indeed, in the Supreme Court's opinion in Paradise it seemed a dif-
ferent test may have been emerging. Although the case was decided
shortly after Wygant, one trying to pinpoint the constitutional stan-
dard finds O'Connor's concept of "fit" more prominent. Now, as part
of a second prong analysis, proponents must provide evidentiary
proof that the plan was necessary to remedy past discrimination.20'
Also, the Paradise test refers specifically to the validity of statistical
data in its third element,2 °2 the same kind of statistical data used to
support the strong basis in evidence that Croson would soon require.
With Croson, the court oscillated again. Richmond did not ade-
quately demonstrate that there was any discrimination in Richmond to
remedy; the Court found the "mere recitation" of a benign purpose
insufficient to show that the city had a compelling governmental in-
terest supporting the plan.20 3 Again, the Court cited the words of
Wygant, but did not make explicitly clear in what part of the strict
scrutiny test the strong basis in evidence standard belongs: the first or
second prong.2°4 Since Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion, one can-
not simply assume that she meant to incorporate in her carefully-
worded opinion a position contrary to her own concurrence in
Wygant. Although the Court considered the statistical evidence in its
discussion of narrow tailoring, the Court announced this standard
within a discussion of compelling interests. The safe assumption is
that the current majority position on this point is not clear, if there is
one. If the strong basis in evidence standard were part of the first
199 See id. at 287. Justice O'Connor stated that:
The Court is in agreement that, whatever the formulation employed, remedying past
or present discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to
warrant to remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program.... It
appears, then, that the true source of disagreement on the Court lies not so much in
defining the state interests which may support affirmative action efforts as in defin-
ing the decree to which the means employed must 'fit' the ends pursued to meet
constitutional standards.
Id.
m It is important to note here that Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wygant has consid-
erable persuasive power, through her opinion in Croson and beyond. Indeed, it may be said that
it is her opinions that have shaped affirmative action jurisprudence. See generally Byme, supra
note 75.
201 The first of the Paradise four-factor narrow-tailoring test requires that the relief be
necessary. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. See also supra text accompanying notes 93-109.
202 The third element is the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market.
See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. See also supra text accompanying notes 93-109.
203 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
20' See id.
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prong, then it would be needed to show that past discrimination was
indeed the true purpose behind the suspect classification. If it were
part of the second prong, then the proponent of a program would need
to have a strong basis in evidence to show that the remedial program
was necessary for relief under Paradise. Justice O'Connor does cite
the Wygant plurality for the notion that without this strong basis, past
discrimination could not have been the true purpose of the plan,205 but
it seems clear that she sacrificed extensive comment on this point for
the sake of a majority opinion. Given Justice O'Connor's lack of
clarity on the subject, it makes the "strong basis in evidence" standard
less than clear.2°6
Lower courts have avoided clearly summarizing the rule of law
they are applying for this reason, but circuits have taken sides on the
issue. The First Circuit has come out clearly on the side of first prong
analysis.20 7 To show that remedying past discrimination was the true
purpose behind the classification, a court looks at whether there is a
strong basis in evidence for an inference of discrimination. Then, the
court looks to see whether the plan is narrowly tailored. The Sec-
ond,208 Third,209 Fourth,2 10 Sixth,2 11 Seventh,212 Eighth,
213 Ninth,214
205 See id. (citing Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975)).
"'6 It may be worth going into considerable detail on this point, but for the present pur-
poses I will simply state that this is one of the myriad of controversial legal arenas in which a
majority of the Court has not yet reached consenss.
207 See Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 499-50 (1 Cir. 1991) (finding that the demonstra-
tion of a compelling interest is an evidentiary issue as to whether the proponent had a strong
basis in evidence to support the remedial purpose); Boston Police, 147 F.3d at 19-20 (same).
208 See Harrison and Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Transp.,
981 F.2d 50,56 (2nd Cir. 1992) (noting that Croson invalidated Richmond's program for falling
to show a compelling interest).
209 See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pennsylvania v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 605 (3d
Cir. 1996) ("Whether this record provides a strong basis in evidence for an inference of dis-
crimination in the prime contract market is a close call. In the final analysis, however, it is a
call that we find unnecessary to make, and we chose not to make it. Even assuming that the
record presents an adequately firm basis for that inference, the judgment of the district court
must be affirmed because Chapter 17-500 is clearly not narrowly tailored to remedy that dis-
crimination.").
210 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4!h Cir. 1994). There, the court stated:
We have established a two-step analysis for determining whether a particular race-
conscious measure can be sustained under the Constitution: (1) the proponent of the
measure must demonstrate a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial
action is necessary, and (2) the remedial measure must be narrowly tailored to meet
the remedial goal.
Il (internal quotations omitted).
211 See United Black Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Akron, 976 F.2d 999, 1009 (6th Cir.
1994) ("Under the first prong of the Croson test, a state actor possesses a compelling state inter-
est when its concern is with the remedy of past discrimination. However, there is no clear ma-
jority mandate in Croson on the degree or quantum of evidence required to identify actual past
discrimination.").
212 See Billish v. City of Chicago, 989 F.2d 890, 897 (7a Cir. 1993) (finding that a showing
of past discrimination under Croson must be made under the first prong, but the court seemed to
require only a showing of past discrimination, and not a causal link between present effects and
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Eleventh,215 and D.C. Circuits 2 16 all agree. The Fifth Circuit, however,
came out the other way: the strong basis in evidence an actor must
show is used to prove whether the remedy was necessary under the
narrow-tailoring test of Paradise.217 While the circuits have failed to
establish consensus on the standard of proof required from Croson's
strong basis in evidence standard, all except the Fifth Circuit seem to
agree on where in strict scrutiny analysis it belongs.
At first blush, it seems that the Fifth Circuit was wrong, if not for
the simple fact that all the other circuits disagree. A rebel circuit, the
Fifth has taken Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wygant to heart.
But it makes a lot of sense to require a causal connection between
purpose and remedy to be part of the narrow-tailoring test. That is, in
effect, what narrow-tailoring is: A causal connection between means
and ends. To require such an analysis when judging compelling inter-
ests, the Court has created a test, the natural outgrowth of which re-
quires affirmative action plans to be doubly narrowly tailored. First, a
proponent must provide conclusive evidence that remedial action was
necessary. Then, the proponent must provide evidence that the par-
ticular remedy chosen was also necessary.218 The Fifth Circuit simply
decided to consolidate the inquiry.
The Fifth Circuit test, though poorly conceived, is not entirely
misconceived. It is possible that the Court could fashion a test akin to
that of the Fifth Circuit. When aclassification is vastly over- or un-
der-inclusive, then it is fails not only the narrow tailoring require-
ment, but it is so incongruous that a different, unarticulated purpose is
suggested. Past discrimination, no matter how compelling it may be,
is irrelevant when the true purpose was to provide minority role mod-
past discrimination); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7h Cir. 1998) (clari-
fying that first prong showing of the existence of past discrimination is required, and necessity
of the remedial action is covered under test for narrow tailoring).
213 See Donaghy, 933 F.2d at 1460 (finding that statistics presenting strong inference of
discrimination, which were not rebutted by plaintiffs, supported claim of remedial purpose).
214 See Associated Gen. Contractors of California v. Coalition for Econ. Quality, 950 F.2d
1401,1414 (9h Cir. 1991) (finding that statistical disparities are necessary to establish a compel-
ling state interest under Croson) (citations omitted).
215 See Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1553 (1 1a Cir. 1994) (finding that a
causal link must approach a prima facie constitutional or statutory violation to satisfy compel-
ling interest under Croson); Cone Constr. Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 913
(11th Cir. 1990) (analyzing the necessity of racial classification to remedy past discrimination
under first prong analysis).
216 See O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. Of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(satisfactory demonstration of the District's response to past discrimination part of compelling
interest part of strict scrutiny test).
217 See supra text accompanying notes 93-109.
218 The first prong analysis requires a prima facie showing of causal connection demon-
strating necessity, and second prong analysis requires "necessity" in light of alternate remedies,
among other things.
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els, for example. But when the means and ends are quite unrelated,
meaning a plan not only fails the narrow tailoring test, but fails mis-
erably, this suggests that the defendant's asserted purpose was not the
one in mind when he started the practice. Certainly, the narrow-
tailoring test of Paradise could be relied to trigger this sort of inquiry.
The test the Fifth Circuit came up with, however, is flawed in
several respects. In addition to an individualistic conception of the
constitutional test for affirmative action programs, the Fifth Circuit
also has an individualistic view of the severity of past discrimination
needed in order to demonstrate a compelling interest. With these two
together, the compelling interest will almost never be established.
Very few municipalities will be able to provide any proof, concrete or
otherwise, linking present conditions to the days of the Civil Rights
Movement. Without this stringent requirement, however, the Fifth
Circuit's compelling interest test lacks all force.219 Because the reme-
dial aspect was addressed only in the court's five-factor narrow-
tailoring test, proponents would need only show some sort of past
discrimination to pass the compelling interest standard. If the Fifth
Circuit were to follow the lenient view of the Ninth Circuit,220 for ex-
ample, past discrimination would almost always be deemed a com-
pelling interest. Then, just as the Court warned against, the Fifth
would accept a "mere recitation" of purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not taken a firm stance on affirmative
action since the concept was first created. The difficulty of the prob-
lem stems in large part from the potential impact that Court decisions
may have on future claims of racial discrimination. Justices are loathe
to sacrifice their stance on a particular issue in one case because the
implications of present day Court decisions for future Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine are huge. And, there is some wisdom in restraint
from making these pronouncements, when "affirmative action" as we
know it today will become less and less of a necessity as African-
Americans become more and more fully incorporated into the society
from which they were so long excluded.
It may be that the lower courts will eventually settle on a stan-
dard without the help of the Supreme Court. Indeed, certain aspects of
affirmative action programs in governmental offices have settled
219 This is because the court required only a demonstration of past discrimination, and not
remedial purpose.
220 See supra notes 139-51 and accompanying text.
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themselves as a result of the decisions of other lower courts.221 But
given the overwhelming similarity of many of these cases, and the
overwhelming similarity of the problems many of these programs
have, it could save a lot of energy on the part of lower courts and city
and county governments if the Supreme Court could step in and pro-
vide some guidance on the problem. Despite any anticipated changes
in the use of affim iative action in hiring and promotions in the future,
they are still used today. If the Court were to highlight what the
strong basis in evidence of Wygant and its progeny is supposed to
show, and what evidence is sufficient to satisfy that requirement, the
job of the lower courts would be much easier.
In sum, although the proper test is clearer now than it was twenty
years ago, the means to conduct that inquiry are still undecided, and
sorely needed given the multitude of affirmative action programs that
are presented to appellate courts. Had the Court taken the Dallas case,
it would have been able to resolve important pieces of the dilemma of
remedial programs. If the Court had commented on the validity of the
Fifth Circuit's test, even if it did not go so far as to clarify the proper
constitutional inquiry, it would have provided useful information for
the other circuits to use when conducting their own constitutional
analysis. What is sorely needed, however, is a proper outline of the
constitutional inquiry to be conducted, including where to place the
strong basis in evidence requirement, and what kinds of statistical and
other data satisfy that inquiry.
PATRICIA L. DONZEt
221 For instance, it could be said that DFD amended its skip promotions procedure so as to
resemble a banding process specifically because of a decision of the Fifth Circuit in another
case, which was not as critical of banding as it was with skip promotions. See Dallas Fire Fight-
ers Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 885 F. Supp. 915, 922 (N.D. Tex. 1995). Cf. Police Ass'n of New
Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159, 1163-64.
t I would like to dedicate this piece to Ian Griffith, who provided a steady supply of
support and constructive criticism that proved instrumental to the completion of this project; and
to my parents, Bill and Jeanne Donze, who have continuously supported me in my pursuit of
higher education.
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